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[Abstract] This study aims at verifying that there is accounting conservatism in the financial reports 
issued by the industrial corporations listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and testing the impact 
of auditing quality characteristics (the auditing firm size, contacts with other global auditing firms, client 
retention period, auditing fees and the specialty in client's industry) on the enhancement of the level of 
accounting conservatism. Towards realizing the objectives of the study, the relationship was estimated and 
examined through the Binomial Test to test the first hypothesis a One-Sample T-Test to test the second 
hypothesis, and multiple regressions of (Ordinary Least Squares OLS). Data of 39 companies of the 
industrial sector for the period 2001-2006 were arranged in a way that made it possible to apply the 
Pooled Data Regression. The study found significant results indicating a low level of accounting 
conservatism in the financial statements issued by the Jordanian industrial corporations. The results 
indicated that some of the characteristics of auditing quality are good, and some of audit quality 
characteristics have an impact on improving the level of accounting conservatism. Based on these results, 
we have provided recommendations to the interested parties.  
 
[Keywords] auditing quality; accounting conservatism; Amman stock exchange (ASE); Jordanian 
company  
Introduction 
Many of the accounting scandals and breakdowns in financial markets have emerged in recent years, but 
the most important results, which were not expected for these events, increased awareness of the 
importance of the role of auditing, and many of the parties realized the crucial role played by the audit in 
the performance of financial markets (Abu Ijela & Hamdan, 2010). On the other hand, the number of 
audit failures declared, as evidenced by the lawsuits and penalties imposed by the stock and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), are very small, having an annual failure rate close to zero (DeFond & Francis, 2005). 
These events led to increased calls for an increase of the quality and effectiveness of the auditing. 
However, there is no agreement on the concept of the auditing quality. Both of the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) failed 
to introduce an explicit concept of the auditing quality. However, there are several attempts to define the 
quality of the auditing, including  the concept of auditing quality being  defined as  the external auditor 
detects an anomaly in financial statements and then revealing it to the users of these statements 
(DeAngelo, 1981).   
Deis and Giroux (1992) argue that the auditing quality is the auditor's ability to detect weaknesses 
and gaps in the accounting system for the client and the reporting. However,  Copley and  Doucet, (1993) 
go in another direction by  defining  the auditing quality as the application of professional standards 
related to field work and reporting standards. The audit quality is a set of methods and techniques that 





work to reduce errors and fraud, which is supported through access to sufficient and convincing evidence 
in order to protect the interests of relevant parties (Abu Ijela & Hamdan, 2010). The probability of 
detection is a matter of competence, whereas the probability of revelation depends on the independence of 
the auditor, i.e., his/her willingness to face the pressure exerted by the producers of financial statements 
(Piot & Janin, 2005). 
Many of the researchers examined the auditing quality and its ability to detect fraud in the financial 
statements and to assist the auditor in reaching the appropriate opinion about the fairness of the financial 
statements. This study attempts to provide additional evidence on the auditing quality in Jordan, and then 
study the ability of the auditing quality to increase the degree of Accounting Conservatism in the financial 
statements that are prepared by Jordanian industrial companies. Accounting conservatism, one of the 
bedrock precepts of financial reporting, reflects a firm’s tendency to recognize "bad news" more promptly 
than "good news" (Basu, 1997). Actually, conservatism requires a greater level of verifiability for 
recognizing good news than bad news in earnings (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003).  The authoritative definition 
of “conservatism” is provided in Financial Statement Concept No. 2, requiring that “possible error in 
measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net 
assets” (FASB, 1980). Changes in compensation patterns, litigation risk, and accounting standards could 
increase the level of conservatism by delaying the recognition of gains (Srivastava & Tse, 2009). 
However, this study is the first study in Jordan that studies the relationship between the auditing quality 
and accounting conservatism, and it is expected to provide significant results in this regard.  
 
Study Problem 
Countries differ in regulations of standards and accounting principles; some use the public sector method 
for accounting standards, while others use the private sector method. All of them try to secure the best 
possible quality of accounting information that helps in decision-making, regardless of their different 
objectives. Such accounting information should be conservative in disclosing profits. The Federal 
American Standard Board (FASB) in its statement of Financial Concepts No. 2 (SFAC No. 2) declared 
that the possible standards error should be geared toward reducing net income and assets, not increasing 
them (FASB, 1980). In a comparative study conducted by Ball et al. (2008) on seven countries using 
private sector accounting regulations found that they were more conservative in their accounting policies 
than those that used the public sector accounting practices.  
Hendriksen (1982) observed that one of the aspects of conservatism was the tendency to be 
pessimistic, not optimistic, when preparing financial reports. This study tries to measure the level of 
conservatism in the financial reports of the industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE) and the impact of auditing quality characteristics on the enhancement of the level of accounting 
conservatism. Measuring the accounting conservatism in the industrial corporations listed on the ASE 
helps in measuring the efficiency of this emerging market. Some studies indicate that the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) is achieved through the conservative financial reports issued by any company, as the 
stock price reflects all the information available at the suitable time (Yaseen, 2008).  
The problem discussed in this study is exemplified through answering the following questions: What 
is the level of accounting conservatism in the financial statements issued by the industrial companies 
listed in (ASE)? What are the impacts of auditing quality characteristics on enhancement of the level of 
accounting conservatism? 
 
Significance and Objectives of the Study  
The significance of this study stems from being the first to measure the level of accounting conservatism 
in the financial statements issued by industrial companies listed in (ASE) using Book-to-Market approach 
and Abnormal Accruals approach. Through this, the study evaluates the role of auditing quality 
characteristics on the enhancement of the level of accounting conservatism and to what extent it can 
oblige companies to have a reasonable level of accounting conservatism.  
 






The study of DeAngelo, (1981) was the first study about the auditing quality and the factors affecting it.  
This study found a positive relationship between auditing quality and the size of the audit firm, but Palm  
(1988) found the auditing quality as adversely affected by litigation in a sample of 472 U.S. companies 
during the period 1960-1985 St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) found  that a lower incidence of litigation is 
associated with the Big 5 auditors compared to non-Big 5 auditors. Using Australian data, Gul et al. (2002) 
showed that higher quality of the Big 5 auditors are associated with higher earnings that may be used as 
an agency-reducing device for firms with low management share ownership or higher agency costs. 
The study of Hoitash et al (2007) examined the relationship between auditors’ fees and the audit 
quality. Contrary to what was expected, this study found a negative relationship between the auditing fees 
and auditing quality. One of the important studies that were conducted in Jordan is the study of Abu Ijela 
and Hamdan (2010). The research investigates the existence of Earnings Management practices in the 
public industrial companies listed in the ASE, and tests the impact of auditing quality characteristics (the 
auditing firm size, connection with other global firms, client retention period, auditing fees, and 
specialization in client's industry) on Earnings Management practices. The researchers conclude that there 
is a significant effect of each characteristic of auditing quality on Earnings Management practices.  
The connection with other global firms and auditing quality differences between big auditing firms 
and non-big auditing firms has received considerable attention in previous research. In Jordan, the Big 5 
auditing firms are commonly associated with higher auditing quality (Abu Ijela & Hamdan, 2010). 
DeAngelo (1981) demonstrated analytically that larger auditing firms have incentives to detect material 
errors and irregularities.  
Accounting conservatism is one of the most important accounting principles that accountants still 
insist on it.  Previous studies find persuasive evidence that accounting conservatism has increased over 
time (Basu, 1997; Givoly & Hayn, 2000; Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Sivakumar & Waymire, 2003; Ryan 
&  Zarowin, 2003; Srivastava & Tse, 2009). 
The accounting conservatism concept was controversial at the turn of last century and is still used. 
Despite the critiques against this principle, it still plays an important principle in accounting practices 
(Watts, 2003a). Today, in the middle of the waves of skepticism regarding financial reports, adherence to 
this principle has become a distinguishing aspect for companies with reference to the transparency of their 
financial reports and a standard for classifying countries according to adherence to accounting principles 
(Hamdan, 2010a) and conservatism, which disclose the expected losses aside from the anticipated 
earnings, in addition to the lowest values of assets. Accounting conservatism implies using strict 
standards when declaring profits (LaFond & Roychowdhury, 2008). This should not lead to undervaluing 
of assets or income (IASB framework, paragraph 37). 
There are two types of conservatism: first, is the conditional, which rapidly acknowledges economic 
losses. Second is the unconditional which reduces the values of net assets or reveals book values of the 
least ownership equity (Ball et al., 2005) The significance of the conservatism principle was re-
emphasized through issuing the following  standards, which contain a lot of conservatism:  the issuance of 
the (FASB) of standards for Accounting for Contingencies (SFAS5) in 1975; the Employer's Accounting 
For Pensions (FSAS87), in 1985; Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets (SFAS121) in 
1995; and the two International Standards (IAS 36) and (IAS 37) (Al-Sahli 2009). 
Some of the benefits of Accounting Conservatism of financial lists are reducing opportunist motives 
for managers when disclosing optimistic results, increasing contracts control, and reducing court costs 
(Watts 2003a, b; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). The need for accounting conservatism is related to the 
increase of credibility in accounting information (Hellman, 2008), as conservatism of declaring good 
results of the company increases accounting credibility and the ability to predict the future. The need for 
conservatism appeared together with the Agency Theory (Basu, 1997) to solve the problem that might 
emerge between managers and stockholders on the separation between management and ownership. 
Suppose that the financial reports issued by the management were conservative (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003a), 
so stockholders might resort to reducing management salaries to compensate for the difference attributed 





to the manager's care for their personal interests.  
To avoid such a situation, managers might resort to present more conservative numbers as an 
indication of not caring for their personal interests (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983), thus shunning legal 
responsibility (Givoly & Hayn, 2000). Ahmed & Duellman (2007) found out that accounting 
conservatism helps reduce agency costs. Finally, Hamdan (2010b) found that accounting conservatism 
contributes to the improvement of quality of financial reporting through an external auditor for a clean 
opinion. This study helps in establishing a relationship between the high level of accounting conservatism 
in Jordanian industrial companies and the improvement of the opinion of external auditor. As for the role 
of accounting conservatism  in improving the efficiency of debt contracts, studies of the last period 
ascertained that accounting conservatism helped  in improving the efficiency of the debt contracts by 
increasing the ability of accounting information to predict the future  (Watts, 2003a; Ball &  Shivakumar, 
2005; Ball al et., 2008).  
Accounting conservatism secures for the debtors stricter policies in declaring profits and, 
consequently, limits profit distribution, as this provides the company with a better opportunity to meet its 
liabilities. But Gigler at el., (2009) saw that accounting conservatism reduces the efficiency of debt 
contracts because it changes the content of accounting, thus reducing the possibility of future prediction. 
In the search for the factors influencing the level of accounting conservatism, many studies considered the 
distinction between companies regarding accounting conservatism in their financial reports. Hamdan, 
(2010a) and Yaseen, (2008) found out that banks are the most conservative in their accounting policies. 
But Al-Sahli (2009) disagreed with them as he found that the banking sector in Saudi Arabia was the least 
conservative in its accounting policies.  As for the relation between the size of company and accounting 
conservation, Hamdan (2010a) found that big companies adopt conservative accounting policies to avoid 
political costs, but Al-Sahli (2009) did not find any relation between the size of the company and the 
degree of accounting conservatism. Contrary to what was expected, Hamdan, (2010a) found that the low-
debt companies were the most conservative in their accounting policies. Al-Sahli's (2009) study did not 
find any effect of debt size on accounting conservatism, but found that establishing the Saudi Stock 
Exchange had an effect on accounting conservatism in financial reporting and that agreed with what the 
study of Labo and  Zhou (2006).  
The demands of the US Securities and Exchange Commission helped in increasing accounting 
conservatism in financial reporting. The accounting conservatism also helps in Quality Disclosure 
(Paprocki & Stone, 2004; Yaseen, 2008). Accounting conservatism also plays a role in Earnings Quality, 
being continuous (Penman & Zhang, 2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley act is considered the most important 
legislation in reinforcing corporate governance, which helps increase accounting conservatism (Labo & 
Zhou, 2006). This was ascertained by the study of Lara et al. (2009), which found that corporate 
governance helped increase accounting conservatism. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) discovered that 
experience of the Audit Committee, one of the pillars of corporate governance, affected the degree of 
accounting conservatism. Yaseen, (2008) did not find any influence of the corporate governance on the 
relation between accounting conservatism and the improvement of quality of disclosure. Accounting 
conservatism is one of the active tools in the corporate governance, which managers can use to improve 
the level of corporate governance in the company (Lara, et al., 2007). 
This study differs from previous studies by being the first to measure accounting conservatism in the 
financial statements issued by industrial companies listed on the ASE, using two different methods. Thus, 
it tries to discover the factors affecting the level of accounting conservatism in these companies. The 
study is expected to present important information for decision makers and regulators of accounting 
profession in Jordan.  
Research Methodology 
Hypotheses Development 
Measuring the Auditing Quality. The auditing quality reflects the efficiency of the auditing operation,  its 
ability to obtain evidence to support the opinion of the external auditor, and the ability to compel the 





company management to implement the accounting principles, the reduction of fraud,  manipulation in 
the financial statements, and to ban earnings management (see Abu Ijela & Hamdan, 2010; Tendeloo & 
Vanstraelen, 2008; Ebrahim, 2001). The majority of previous studies identified the following elements to 
measure the auditing quality: (Connie et al., 1998; Ebrahim, 2001; Piot & Janin, 2005; Abu Ijela & 
Hamdan, 2010): 
• Size of the auditing firm; if it was one of the top five (Big 5) in Jordan or not. 
• The contacts with other global auditing firm.  
• The client retention period. 
• The auditing fees. 
• Specialization in client's industry.  
The first hypothesis of this paper aims at measuring the auditing quality in auditing firms, which 
examines the financial statements of the Jordanian industrial corporations listed in the ASE. The first 
hypothesis can be written as follows: H01: The auditing firms in Jordan are not characterized by high 
auditing quality. 
Measuring the Accounting Conservatism. In this study, we examine whether this trend in accounting 
conservatism arises from delayed recognition of gains or from more prompt recognition of losses.  This 
study attempts to provide additional evidence on the level of accounting conservatism in financial 
statements of the Jordanian industrial corporations listed in the ASE, using a different methodology from 
the methodology used by the study of Hamdan (2010a), which used the model of Basu 1997. Thus, the 
second hypothesis can be written as follows: H02: There is no acceptable level of accounting conservatism 
in financial statements issued by Jordanian industrial corporations. 
The Impact of Auditing Quality on Enhancement of the Accounting Conservatism level. After  
discovering the audit quality in the Jordanian auditing firms and after measuring the level of accounting 
conservatism in the financial statements issued by Jordanian industrial corporations, the third hypothesis 
aims at measuring the impact of auditing quality, which includes the size of the auditing firm, contacts 
with other global auditing firms, client retention periods, auditing fees, and specialization  in client's 
industry,  on the enhancement  of the level of accounting conservatism in the financial statements issued 
by Jordanian industrial corporations. The third hypothesis can be written as follows: H03: There is no 
statistically significant impact of the auditing quality characteristics on increasing the level of accounting 
conservatism in the financial statements issued by Jordanian industrial corporations.  
 
Study Sample 
The study sample includes all Jordanian industrial corporations listed in the ASE. The study sample 
included the company which achieved the following conditions:  it is not merged with another company,   
it did not stop trading its shares, and it disclosed all data needed for the study. The number of companies 
which have achieved these conditions are (39) during the period 2001-2006.  
 
Variables Measurement 
This study depended in its measuring of variables on the previous studies, and it developed new 
measuring methods. Table 1 shows the measuring of the study variables and their expected sign. 
 
Study Models 
The current study has developed two models to measure the impact of the audit quality on improving the 
level of accounting conservatism.  Two methods have been used to indicate the accounting conservatism:  
Book-to-Market (BTM) ratio and abnormal accruals. We have built a model for each method as follows: 
First Model: The first measure for accounting conservatism is a market-value-based approach; in the 
first model, we used the (BTM) ratio as an indicator of accounting conservatism, which is considered the 
dependent variable in the following model:  
 



















BTMi,t: “Measure of accounting conservatism” the Book-to-Market ratio for firm (i) at the end of year (t). 
β1: is the constant. 
β2..10: is the slope of the independent and controls variables.  
             Big5i,t: the size of auditing firm, for the firm (i) in the year of (t). (dummy variable). 
Globali,t: Link the auditing firm with global auditing firms, for the firm (i) in the year of (t). 
(dummy variable). 
Keepi,t: the client retention period, for the firm (i) in the year of (t). 
Feesi,t: amount of auditing fees, for the firm (i) in the year of (t). 
             Professionali,t: the auditing firm specialized in the industry of the client, for the firm (i) in the year 
of (t).  (Dummy variable). 
             Sizei,t: Natural log of total assets, for the firm (i) in the year of (t). 
Leveragei,t: the financial leverage, for the firm (i) in the year of (t). 
AC Memi,t: Number of members of the auditing committee for the firm (i) in the year of (t). 
             AC Expi,t: Number of members of the auditing committee  which have Financial experience for 
the firm (i) in the year of (t). 
ti,l : random error.  
Second Model: The second measure of the auditing conservatism was carried out by using the accrual-
















 ABACCi,t: “Measure of accounting conservatism” the abnormal accruals for firm i at the end of year t. 
In order to measure the abnormal accruals according to Phillips et al. (2003), we used the amended 
Jones model to estimate normal and abnormal accruals. Based on Dechow et al. (2003); Phillips et al. 
(2003); and Matsumoto (2002).  The abnormal accruals can be calculated according to the following steps:  
First step: Estimating Total Accruals: the total accruals are measured by the difference between net 
income and net cash flows from operating activities, as follows: 
)3(,,, tititi OCFNITACC −=  
Where:  
TACCi,t: is the total accruals for firm (i) in year (t). NIi,t: is the net income for firm (i) in year (t). 
OCFi,t: is the operating cash flow for firm (i) in year (t). 
 







Variable Label Measurement Expected 
sign Model 1 
Expected 
sign Model 2 
Dependent variables: 
accounting conservatism 
    
Book to Market Ratio BTM The book value/market value, market 
value are: (number of issued shares × 








  -- -- 
 
Size of the audit firm 
Big5 Dummy value (1 = if the audit firm 
among the Big five auditing firms; 0 = 
otherwise) Based on study of (Farag, 
2005), which defined big audit firms 
in Jordan. 
-- -- 
The contacts with other 
global audit firms 
Global Dummy value (1 = if the auditing firm 
have links with global audit firms;   0 
= otherwise)  
- - 
The client retention 
period 
Keep Continuous variable: years numbers of 
the client retention period 
- - 
Auditing fees Fees Continuous variable: amount of 
auditing fees 
+ + 
Specialization in client's 
industry 
Prof. Dummy value (1 = If the audit firm 
specialization in the client’s industry; 
0 = otherwise) 
- - 
Control Variables   - - 
Company size Size Natural log of total assets (in 
thousands of Jordanian Dinar) 
-/+ -/+ 






Number of members of the audit 
committee -/+ -/+ 
Audit committee 
experience 
AC Exp. Number of members of the audit 
committee  which have financial 
experience 
-/+ -/+ 
























































TACCi,t: is the total accruals of firm (i) in year (t). 
Ai, t-1 : is the total assets of firm (i) at the end of year ( t-1). 
REVi,t : is the change in revenues of firm (i) between years (t) and (t-1). 
RECi,t : is the change in receivables of firm (i) between years (t) and (t-1). 
PPEi,t : is the level of fixed assets of firm (i) in year (t).  
ti,l : random error.  
Third Step, Estimating Normal Accruals: use the beta (β), which was found in the previous step for the 





estimation of abnormal accruals:  

















NACCi,t: is the normal accruals of firm (i) in year (t). 
Final Step, Estimation of the Abnormal Accruals: the abnormal accruals are measured by the difference 
between total accruals and normal accruals, as follows: 
)6(,,, tititi NACCTACCABACC −= 
Where:  
ABACCi,t: is the abnormal accruals of firm (i) in year (t). 
 
Data Analysis and Testing of Hypotheses 
This item includes three major parts: the first is concerned with the validity of the data for statistical 
analysis. The second deals with descriptive statistics for variables of the study from the perspective of 
many descriptive statistical standards, and the third tests the study hypotheses.  
First Stage: Testing the Validity of Data for Statistical Analysis 
Models of this study belong to the General Linear Model (GLM) that requires many conditions before 
being practiced. Therefore, data of this study must be tested to make sure that they meet the conditions of 
the GLM. What follows is testing data credibility for statistical analysis. Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the 
necessary tests needed to test data validity of statistical analysis.  
A. Normal-Distribution Test 
To secure approximation of data to normal distribution, Jarque Bera (J-B), a parametric test, was used. 
The decision basis was to accept the null hypothesis that the data follow normal distribution if the 
probability of the J-B test was more than 0.05 (Gujarati, 2003).  The proximity of the testing data from the 
normal distribution for all continuous variables was related to the study (Auditor Fees, Company Size, 
Financial Leverage, Members of AC, Experience of AC, BTM, and ATP). The remaining variable (Big5, 
Global, Keep, and Prof.), are dichotomous variables (Dummy variables); they are not subject to the 
normal distribution. From Table (2), which is related to the normal distribution to the study variables, the 
study has found from the Jarque-Bera test that the statistical value is high, and significant value 
(probability) is less than 5% for all continuous variables, which means that it's not close to its normal 
distribution. To overcome this problem, the natural logarithm for these variables was considered. Because 
the size of the sample was big, not distributing the data normally may not influence credibility of the 
study.  To support the results from the Jarque-Bera test, we used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and its 
results support the Jarque-Bera test.   
 
Table 2 
Tests for Normal Distribution of the Continuous Variables 
Variables 
Jarque-Bera Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
J-B Prob. K-S Prob. 
Fees 1139.3 0.000 0.242 0.000 
Company Size 8820.0 0.000 0.374 0.000 
Financial Leverage 843.2 0.000 0.117 0.000 
Members of AC 2560.1 0.000 0.540 0.000 
Experience of AC 9.7 0.008 0.282 0.000 
BTM 1832.2 0.000 0.185 0.000 
ATP 13346.8 0.000 0.312 0.000 





B. Multicollinearity Problem Test 
The strength of the General Linear Model (GLM) basically depends on the hypothesis that every variable 
from the independent ones is by itself independent. If this condition is not realized, the GLM will then be 
not applicable. It can never be considered good for parameters' evaluation (Sifo & Mishal, 2003). To 
actualize this, the correlation matrix among independent variables was used, and the Collinearity 
Diagnostics Standard used an incessant tolerance quotient for every variable of the independent ones.  
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) has to be found afterwards. This test is the standard that measures the 
effect of independent variables. Gujarati (2003) stated that getting a VIF higher than 10 indicates that 
there is a multicollinearity problem for the independent variable of concern.   
Table 3 shows the results of Spearman and Pearson's correlation matrix between each pair of 
independent variables of the sample companies, and we note that there is multicollinearity between these 
variables. The correlation among them is very weak but has significant statistical association relationship 
at the 1% and 5% levels, which means that the study model is effective in explaining and determining the 
effect on the dependent variable. To certify the previous result, the study uses the Collinearity Diagnostics 
test to support the credibility of the results.   
 
Table 3 
 Spearman (top) and Pearson (bottom) Correlations Matrix between the Independent Variables 
Variables Big5 Global Keep Fees Prof. Size Leverage Members 
Big5 
 0.258** -0.066 0.473** -0.016 0.361** -0.067 -0.085 
Global 
0.258**  0.007 0.023 -0.103 0.160** 0.075 0.085 
Keep 
-0.066 0.007  0.038 0.518** -0.022 0.040 -0.045 
Fees 
0.331** 0.222** 0.096  0.050 0.374** -0.030 -0.052 
Prof 
-0.016 -0.103 0.518** 0.060  0.143* 0.095 -0.348** 
Size 
0.202** 0.321** 0.038 0.266** -0.027  0.047 -0.125 
Leverage 





5% levels (2-tailed) 
 
From Table 4, one can notice that the VIF value for all independent variables is less than 10, which means 
that we do not have any Collinearity problem in the models of the study. 
 










Test Heteroskedasticity Test 
Time Series Stationarity 
Unit Root Test 





White Test ADF PP 
Global 0.756 1.322 First Model (BTM) -5.290 -5.491 
Keep 
0.693 1.443 7.140 
 
0.000 -6.686 -8.097 
Fees 0.807 1.239 
 
-6.359 -6.655 
Prof 0.595 1.682 
Second  Model 
(ABACC) 
2.344 
Second  Model (ABACC) -5.085 -4.557 
Company 
Size 
0.817 1.224 0.736 
 
0.726 -3.400 -5.467 
Financial 
Leverage 








0.814 1.229 -5.177 -4.728 
ADF & PP-Critical value at confidence level of 99% is -3.44, and level of 95% is -2.87 
Durbin–Watson d Statistic at k=9 and n=234 is: dL1.675 – dU1.863 
 
C. Autocorrelation Problem Test 
The autocorrelation problem in the model emerges when the two neighboring scenes are correlated, and 
that influences the credibility of the model. The influence of the independent variables will be great due to 
that correlation. To verify that the Durbin Watson (D-W) test was used, Table 4 shows that the D-W value 
of the two models is beyond the d-statistic range, which is less than the minimal range dL in first model 
and more than dU in the second model. This indicates the presence of autocorrelation in these two models 
(Gujarati, 2003). To overcome this problem Lag1 has to be considered when testing models of the study.  
 
D. Heteroskedasticity Problem Test 
One of the significant assumptions of the classical regression models and implementation of the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) is the actual presence of Homoskedasticity. Besides, its mean should be equal to zero 
(Awad, 2000). If the Heteroskedasticity is present in the model, then some statistical methods will be used 
to overcome this problem, like using the White test, which is routinely conducted by using the E-Views 
program after being elicited from the program themselves. From Table 4, we find that the p-value (Prob.) 
of the second model is more than (0.05), which indicates admitting the null hypothesis. This model suffers 
from actual Heteroskedasticity, but the problem was overcome by using White. As for the first model, the 
p-value for the White test was less than (0.05); this proves the presence of Homoskedasticity in the model.  
 
E. Time Series Stationarity Test 
Empirical research that uses time series, like the case of this study, presupposes stability of these series. 
Autocorrelation might occur in the model because the time series on which this study is based is non-
stationary (Gujarati, 2003). To check the Stationarity of the time series, a Unit Root test, which includes 
the parametric Augmented Dicky-Fuller test (ADF) and the non-parametric Phillips-Person (PP) test, 





were used. From  Table 4, one could notice that the absolute value for one of the two tests: the parametric 
(ADF) and the non-parametric (PP) were  bigger than the critical value of the levels 1% and 5%, which 
meant acceptance of the null hypothesis that the data of time series (2001-2006) was stationary.  
 
Second Stage: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for continuous and dummy study variables. From this table, the data 
can be described as follows: in the dependent variable (Accounting Conservatism), we noted that the 
BTM ratio is positive during all years of study (2001-2006), an indication of reduced conservatism in 
financial statements issued by Jordanian industrial corporations.  These companies have been assessed 
greater than their fair market value. The independent variables (auditing quality) include five variables: ) 
the size of auditing firms, and the connection of the auditing firms with global auditing firms, the period 
of the auditing firms work with the client, fees of the audit firm, and the specialization in client's industry. 
From Table 5, we noted that the Big 5 in Jordan, which have been classified based on Farag's (2005) and  
Belhaj's (2006) studies,  dominate the auditing market. In the link between the auditing firms with global 
auditing firms, we noted that one-third of the auditing firms have links with global auditing companies, 
which contributes to earning a lot of experience and skills in auditing.  
 




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Part (A) Dependent 
variables       
Accounting conservatism: 
BTM ratio 1.369 1.063 0.624 0.853 0.783 0.944 
Part (B) Independent 
variables:       
Big 0.690 0.690 0.690 0.690 0.640 0.620 
Global 0.360 0.310 0.330 0.330 0.310 0.330 
Keep 0.820 0.870 0.950 0.920 0.920 0.870 
Fees 8,480 9,607 11,166 10,846 11,654 12,189 
Prof. 0.670 0.690 0.690 0.690 0.690 0.690 
Part (C) Control Variables: 
      
Company size (000` JOD)
* 
30,996 33,362 34,129 63,572 75,741 40,887 
Financial leverage 0.322 0.300 0.321 0.297 0.263 0.273 
Audit Committee  
Members 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
Audit Committee  
Experience 
0.366 0.411 0.407 0.407 0.401 0.407 
* 1 Jordanian Dinar = 1.4 US Dollar 
 
Table 5 shows that auditing fees in Jordan are on continuous rise from year to year. The average of 
auditing fees in 2001 was 8,480 JOD; the auditing fees have increased until they became 12,189 in 2006. 
We note that 82-95% of the auditing firms of Jordan have been working with the same clients for more 
than 3 years, and more than two-thirds of the auditing firms of Jordan have experience in the client's 





industry. As for the control variables,  we note that the market value of Jordanian industrial corporations 
is growing from year to year, and the dependence of the Jordanian industrial corporations on debt to 
finance their assets had declined in recent years, and that all Jordanian industrial corporations abide by the 
law of Jordan in terms of the members of auditing committee, which should not be less than  3 members, 
and more than two-thirds of the members of auditing committees must have a certificate in the field of 
finance and accounting.  
 
Third Stage:  Data Analysis and Testing of Hypotheses 
 
First Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis aims at measuring the auditing quality in Jordanian auditing firms. In order to test the 
auditing quality, we will test four auditing quality characteristics: size of the auditing firm, connection 
with other global auditing firms, client retention period, and specialization in client's industry.  We used 
the Binomial test because the distribution of these variables is binomial distribution. The most common 
use of the binomial test is in cases where the null hypothesis is that two categories are equally likely to 
occur. The null hypothesis states there is no difference in the auditing quality in the Jordanian auditing 
firms. In symbols: 0.5quality) auditing-low(q and0.5quality) auditing-high(:0 ==== pppH  
The alternative hypothesis states there is difference in the auditing quality in the Jordanian auditing firms.  
In symbols: )5.0(5.0:1 ≠≠ qandpH  
 
Table 6  















































Table 6 shows the results of the Binomial test for testing the first hypothesis. From this table, we noted 
that the high proportion of the following auditing quality characteristics: Big 5, Keep, Prof., and p-values 
are less than 0.05; based on these results, we accepted the alternative hypothesis and rejected null 
hypothesis, and we can say that the auditing quality in Jordan is good.  This result consistent with the 
results of previous studies (e. g., Abu Ijela & Hamdan, 2010).  
 
Second Hypothesis 
The study of Hamdan (2010a) concluded that the level of accounting conservatism is low in the financial 
statements of Jordanian industrial corporations. Hamdan’s (2010a) was based on Basu's (1997) model to 
reach these results and coincided with the results of Yassin (2008), who used a different approach in the 
research. However, the study at hand, uses the BTM ratio and Abnormal Accruals to measure the level of 
accounting conservatism. If the coefficient of the t-statistic comes with a negative sign and is statistically 
significant, we can ensure that there is a high level of accounting conservatism. Table 7 shows the results 
of a One-Sample T-test to test the second hypothesis. 





Table 7 is divided into two parts: Panel A shows the results of the One-Sample T-Test to measure  the 
accounting conservatism using the abnormal accruals.  This part shows that the average of abnormal 
accruals were negative only in two years, which are 2001 and 2002. Therefore, we cannot confirm that the 
financial statements issued by the Jordanian industrial corporations have an acceptable level of 
accounting conservatism, based on the abnormal accruals approach. 
 
Table 7 
Results of One-Sample T-test to Testing the Second Hypothesis 
Indicators of accounting conservatism 
 
One-Sample T-test  










2003 -1,091,947 -1.348  
0.093 







2006 2,773,550 1.113  
0.136 

























10% levels.  
t-Critical: at df 39, and confidence level of  99% is 2.457  and level of 95% is 1.684 and level of 90% is 1.303 
 
Panel (B) shows that the results of the One-Sample t-Test to measure the level of accounting conservatism 
by using the Book-to-Market ratio. This part shows that all the study years do not meet these conditions 
of accounting conservatism. Therefore, we cannot say for sure that the financial statements issued by the 
Jordanian industrial corporations have an acceptable level of accounting conservatism, based on the 
Book-to-Market ratio approach. Based on the results in Panel (A) and (B), we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, and we cannot say for sure that the financial statements issued by the Jordanian industrial 
corporations have an acceptable level of accounting conservatism based on the BTM ratio and Abnormal 
Accruals.  
Our findings coincided with the results of Hamdan (2010a) and Yassin (2008), who concluded that 
the financial statements of Jordanian industrial corporations are not characterized by an acceptable level 
of accounting conservatism, and with the results of Al-Sahli (2009), who found that accounting 
conservatism in industrial corporations in Saudi Arabia is low.  
 
Third Hypothesis 
Eventually, the study models will be tested. These models aim at identifying the impact of auditing 
quality on improving the level of accounting conservatism. The sample of the study consists of a group of 
companies (Cross Section Data) during the period of time (Time Series Data); the best regression model 
for these data is (Pooled Data Regression), the statistical program (E-Views) was used to test the models. 
Table 8 shows the results of multiple regressions for the study models. 
 





Table 8  
Results of Multiple Regressions for the Study Models 
                                                                                Model 1 (N = 234)                           Model 2 (N = 234) 









Size of the audit firm Big 5 - -0.517 -3.164 0.002 -0.291 -2.159 0.032 
The connection with 
other global audit 
firms 
Global - 0.132 0.852 0.395 0.186 1.049 0.295 
The client retention 
period 
Keep + 0.174 0.630 0.529 -0.918 -2.093 0.038 
The auditing fees 
Fees - 0.000 -0.830 0.408 0.786 1.889 0.060 
Specialty in client's 
industry 
Prof. - -0.466 -1.906 0.058 -0.482 1.888 0.060 
Company size Size -/+ 0.000 -4.170 0.000 0.000 -0.066 0.948 
Financial leverage 





-/+ -0.668 -2.591 0.010 -0.372 -1.559 0.121 
Audit committee 
experience 
AC Exp. -/+ 0.171 0.783 0.435 -0.284 -0.768 0.444 
t-Critical: at df 39, and confidence level of 95% is 1.684 and level of 99% is 2.423 
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 39-9-1 = 29) and (df for numerator =β = 9) and confidence level of 95% is 
2.210 and confidence level of 99% is 3.070 
 
Size of the Auditing Firm 
The previous studies indicate that the big auditing firms are able to improve the quality of financial 
statements and reduce the earnings management (Connie et al., 1998; Ebrahim, 2001). But Hamdan and  
Abu Ijela (2010) found that the big auditing firms (Big 5) in Jordan are inefficient in limiting the earnings 
management as regards the impact of the Big 5 in Jordan to improve  the level of accounting conservatism. 
Table 8 shows that the relationship between the Big 5 and the BTM ratio was negative in the first model, 
which means that the big auditing firms are able to improve the level of accounting conservatism in 
financial statements. When we tested the null hypothesis (β1=0) against the alternative hypothesis (β1≠0), 
we found that the value of t-statistic is -3.164, which is greater than the critical value, and the p-value is 
less than 0.05. In the second model (which uses abnormal accruals as an indicator of accounting 
conservatism), Table 8 shows that the relationship between the Big 5 and the Abnormal Accruals are 
negative, also (β1=0.291). The value of the t-statistic is -2.159, which is greater than the critical value, and 
the p-value is less than 0.05, which means the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis and rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Accordingly, it is possible to confirm that the big auditing firms, the Big 5, in Jordan are 
able to compel corporations to observe a high level of accounting conservatism when preparing financial 
statements.  
 
The Relationship with Other Global Auditing Firm 
The study of Hamdan and Abu Ijela (2010) did not find the impact of “The connection with other global 
auditing firms” on improving the earnings quality and reduction of the earnings management. About the 
impact of "Global" on improving the level of accounting conservatism, Table 8 shows that the 
relationship between the "Global" and the accounting conservatism is positive, contrary to what is 
expected, is not statistically significant in the two models, which means rejection of the alternative 
hypothesis. We cannot reject the null hypothesis, because it can be emphasized that the "connection with 
other global auditing firms" is not able to compel companies to force a high level of accounting 
conservatism when preparing financial statements. 





The Client Retention Period 
Many of the previous studies confirmed that the auditing firms which maintain customers for a substantial 
period are not able to prevent fraud in financial statements. As for the impact of “Keep” on improving the 
level of accounting conservatism, Table 8 shows that the relationship between the “Keep” and the (BTM) 
ratio are positive in first model, and this variable is not statistically significant.  But in the second model, 
the relationship between the “Keep" and the "Abnormal Accruals" was negative and statistically 
significant, which means that the auditing firms which retain customers for a substantial period may 
improve the level of accounting conservatism in financial statements. These results differ from previous 
studies. 
 
The Auditing Fees 
The rise in auditing fees is an incentive for auditors to increase their efficiency to detect and prevent 
earnings management and to improve the quality of financial statements (Abu Ijela & Hamdan, 2010). 
But the impact of “Fees” to improve the level of accounting conservatism, Table 8, shows that the 
relationship between the “Fees” and the “MTB ratio and abnormal accruals” is positive and not 
statistically significant,  which means rejection of the alternative hypothesis. This means that the amount 
of auditing fees have no role in improving accounting conservatism in financial statements. 
 
The Specialization of the Client's Industry 
Our study inquires if the auditors’ specialization in the industry of the client helps them to exert a high 
level of accounting conservatism. Table 8 shows that the relationship between the "Prof." and the 
accounting conservatism is negative and statistically significant at 95%; we can say that the auditor 
specialization in the industry of the client helps improve the level of accounting conservatism.  
 
Testing of the Control Variables 
The company size: The study of Hamdan (2010b) found that the large companies are most conservative. 
But Sahli, (2009) did not find that there is an impact of the company size on the level of accounting 
conservatism. Our study used a different approach to measure accounting conservatism and found that 
there is a negative relationship between the company size and BTM ratio and Abnormal Accruals.  This 
means that a positive relationship between company size and accounting conservatism exists, which 
indicates that large companies are the most conservative.  
Financial leverage: Table 8 shows that the relationship of "Financial leverage" with the BTM ratio 
and Abnormal Accruals is negative. This means that there is a positive relationship between financial 
leverage and accounting conservatism. This means that the companies which are more dependent on debt 
are most conservative. However, this relationship is not statistically significant, where: t-Statistic < t-
Critical and the p-value > 0.05 in the two models. The previous results are different from the results of 
Hamdan (2010a), who indicated that there is a negative relationship between the value of debt and the 
level of conservatism.  
Audit committee members: Table 8 shows that the relationship of "AC Mem." with the "BTM ratio 
and Abnormal Accruals" is negative. This means that there is a positive relationship between audit 
committee members and conservatism; however, this relationship in the first model was statistically 
significant, but in the second model was not significant.  
Audit committee experience: Table 8 shows us that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between “audit committee experience” and the level of conservatism. This means that the financial 
experience of audit committee members does not contribute to increasing the level of conservatism in 
financial statements issued by Jordanian industrial corporations. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study aims to achieve three goals. The auditing quality in Jordan was investigated, and the study 
found that the majority of auditing firms which audited the financial statements of Jordanian industrial 
corporations, are among the big auditing firms, also found out that one-third of the auditing firms have 





relations with the global auditing firms, and we also found that a large percentage of Jordanian auditing 
firms maintain their customers for more than three years; this is reflected negatively on the auditing 
quality. Finally, we found that the majority of auditing firms in Jordan are specialized in the client's 
industry. These results give good indicators on the auditing quality in Jordan. Based on these findings, the 
study makes  a number of recommendations, which are as follows: encouraging auditing firms to establish 
relationships with global auditing firms,  promoting  the merger of auditing firms in order to increase 
efficiency, m ensuring the client retention period not exceed three years, and dividing  the auditing firms 
based on their specialization in their client's industry.  
The second part of the study was designed to measure the level of accounting conservatism in 
financial statements issued by Jordanian industrial corporations. Based on the study results, we cannot 
determine the existence of an acceptable level of conservatism in the financial statements issued by the 
Jordanian industrial corporations; we recommend that supervisors of Jordanian companies issue laws and 
regulations that increase the level of accounting conservatism.  
The third part of the study was designed to measure the impact of auditing quality characteristics on 
improving the level of accounting conservatism. This is clear from the use of multiple regression models 
for the study that some of characteristics of auditing quality have an impact on improving the accounting 
conservatism; these are the size of the auditing firm, the Big 5, and specialization in client's industry 
(Prof.). But the other auditing quality characteristics do not have an impact on improving the accounting 
conservatism; they are the connection with other global auditing firms (Global) and the auditing fees 
(Fees). But the relationship between the client retention periods (Keep) with conservatism was in doubt, 
and we have not been able to prove or disprove this relationship. Based on these results, we recommend 
that the professional associations in Jordan (which supervise the auditing work) and the government work 
to improve the auditing quality in Jordan, as some of the characteristics of auditing quality have impact on 
the enhancement the level of conservatism.  
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